A single honoree this year, recognized for his work on market power and regulation.

Tyler Cowen at Marginal Revolution put together a rapid response.  The other members of the Marginal Revolution team have weighed in.  The Economist's Free Exchange has background.  John Palmer is first not thrilled, then discovers that the Popular Perspective is wrong.

Here's Econ Log's David Henderson explaining how the Popular Perspective gets it wrong.
I looked back at everything I had seen that morning and realized that it was the Nobel Committee, with its emphasis on reining in big business, that had colored my view of Tirole. That wasn't fair to Tirole. But it also gave me my angle: contrast Tirole's cautiousness with the Committee's aggressiveness.
William Shughart suggests that drawing policy implications from game theory without explicitly considering rent-seeking, regulatory capture, and public choice.
Professor Tirole treats policy interventions “intended” to restrain the exercise of market power and to protect consumers against its abuse as being designed and implemented by benevolent “public servants,” who survey dispassionately a nation’s industrial economy, identify and then surgically excise the tumors of monopoly, all with laser-sharp eyes on enhancing social welfare.
I wonder, though, how carefully he read Theory of Industrial Organization. Its message, when it comes to the welfare implications of monopoly or oligopoly is, It's Complicated. Even in relatively simple game-theory examples, and the book has a lot of those.

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