IRANIAN MODERATES.

Forty years ago, Ronald Reagan's foreign policy team was under the impression such people existed, and the United States could treat with them to get some hostages held elsewhere in the Middle East freed, but not in exchange for weapons.  That unforced error came to light, it might have contributed to the Republicans losing a Senate majority in November 1986, and to this day there are moonbats of a certain persuasion who will use "Iran-Contra" as a talisman to discredit the entire political bundle of lower taxes, deregulation, and military strength.

Now comes Eldar Mamedov, a Brussels resident who works for something called the Quincy Institute, fretting about the sequential removal of high Iranian officials.  "By killing moderate voices, the US and Israel are paving the way for the most extreme hardline factions to fill the void."

Case in point:

Israel’s assassination of Ali Larijani, the powerful secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council — now confirmed by Iran — carries far greater political than operational significance.

The Iranian system has demonstrated considerable resilience in replacing political and military leaders killed by the U.S. and Israel. Larijani’s removal is unlikely to meaningfully impact the operational level; the system is designed to absorb blows and counterattack, as evidenced by the effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

The far greater significance lies in the political sphere. With Larijani gone, a relatively moderate figure accustomed to dealing with the West — and one who wielded significant influence within the system — is eliminated. This makes any potential off-ramp or diplomatic settlement of the war vastly more difficult.

Mr Mamedov has had opportunities to enjoy Mr Larijani's hospitality, during which he formed the following impression.

The impression he left was that of a staunch Iranian nationalist — not a hardcore Islamist, dogmatic revolutionary, or reformist. A massive map of Iran overlooked his office, which was otherwise adorned in traditional Persian style. He frequently spoke of Iran’s millennia-long traditions of statehood, emphasizing the heritage of the Sassanian Empire in particular.

This was not mere rhetoric. It was designed to convey to his interlocutors a vision of Iran as a major historical reality and geopolitical player straddling the Persian Gulf, Iraq, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. The message, delivered while Western powers and Iran were negotiating the nuclear agreement, was clear: Iran is ready to make a deal, but it will zealously guard what it considers its sovereign rights — such as domestic uranium enrichment and regional security interests. His discourse was notably devoid of references to Islam or the revolution, emphasizing instead Iran’s identity as a civilizational state.

Isn't that how diplomacy works?  You look for the points of agreement, and antagonizing a Brussels bureaucrat by going full jihad isn't productive, whether or not the objective of the jihad is the restoration of the Sassanid status quo or not.  Moreover, those senior Iranian officials, with their gray beards, wire-framed glasses, and enigmatic smiles, have a reassuring look about them.  Put one of those mushroom hats on their heads and they could walk across any campus quadrangle with nobody noticing anything out of place.

Read on, though, and perhaps the professorial-looking politician is an enforcer for the mullahs all the same.

Larijani consolidated his role as a pragmatic figure, leveraging his ultimate insider status to reach out to segments of the population growing increasingly frustrated with the rigidities of daily life in the Islamic Republic, such as the compulsory hijab.

But he was never a reformist. Larijani was, first and foremost, a statist for whom the stability and security of the system—as the guarantor of national sovereignty—were paramount. This explains his reportedly pivotal role in suppressing the widespread protests against the Islamic Republic in January 2026 and organizing resistance to the subsequent U.S.-Israel war.

That does not suggest, however, that Larijani’s vision excluded reform entirely. But reform could only take place once stability was secured, and in a tightly controlled, top-down fashion. It could potentially combine relative social and cultural liberalization—as the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Larijani was among those urging against implementing the drastic “chastity law” adopted by the parliament’s hardline majority to enforce the hijab—with economic opening. Larijani and other pragmatic conservatives, like current parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, were tentatively looking toward to a Pakistani model as a possibility for a post-Khamenei Iran.

A "Pakistani model." Presumably complete with nuclear weapons of its own. "By removing figures like Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — with his stated opposition to the bomb — and pragmatists like Ali Larijani, accustomed to dealing with the world, the US and Israel are paving the way for the most extreme hardline factions to fill the void."

Next man up.

SECOND SECTION.

🚨 Breaking: The new head of Basij who replaced the previous head of Basij who was eliminated yesterday, was eliminated today

— Dr. Eli David (@DrEliDavid) March 19, 2026

Next man up.