I bookmarked
Social Instability Lies Ahead, Researcher Says sometime in late 2016 or early 2017, part of a whole bunch of links I flagged in the immediate fallout of the surprise 2016 presidential election. Most of those have been overtaken by events and will go into the memory hole. This one is different. The researcher is UConn's Peter Turchin,
professor of ecology and environmental biology, and the university's press release riffs off a
column he had offered to Bloomberg back in the heady days when Donald Trump was
simply trolling Barack Obama for concealing his Kenyan birth.
Elite overproduction generally leads to more intra-elite competition that gradually undermines the spirit of cooperation, which is followed by ideological polarization and fragmentation of the political class. This happens because the more contenders there are, the more of them end up on the losing side. A large class of disgruntled elite-wannabes, often well-educated and highly capable, has been denied access to elite positions.
That dynamic has been with us well before the turn of the century: during the 1980s, the Deep Thinkers suggested that it was
too many lawyers and too few engineers coming out of colleges that lead to deindustrialization and merger mania. That dynamic might still be at work although these days it might be more convenient to slag on gender studies majors. The professor argues, however, that positional arms races are only part of the looming crisis.
The victory of Donald Trump changes nothing in this equation. The “social pump” creating new aspirants for political offices continues to operate at full strength. In addition to politically ambitious multi-millionaires, the second important source of such aspirants is U.S. law schools, which every year churn out twice as many law graduates as there are job openings for them – about 25,000 “surplus” lawyers, many of whom are in debt. It is emblematic that the 2016 election pitted a billionaire against a lawyer.
Another visible sign of increasing intra-elite competition and political polarization is the fragmentation of political parties. The Republican Party is in the process of splitting up into three factions: Traditional Republicans, Tea Party Republicans, and Trump Populists. These divisions run so deep that many Republicans refused to endorse Trump, and some even voted for Clinton. Similar disintegrative forces have also been at work within the Democratic Party, with a major fault line dividing Bernie Sanders’ Democratic Socialists from the Establishment Democrats of Obama and Clinton.
So far in this analysis I have emphasized elite overproduction. There are two reasons for it. First, as I mentioned before, other factors are much better understood, and have been discussed, by social scientists and political commentators. Secondly, cliodynamic research on past societies demonstrates that elite overproduction is by far the most important of the three main historical drivers of social instability and political violence (see Secular Cycles for this analysis).
But the other two factors in the model, popular immiseration (the stagnation and decline of living standards) and declining fiscal health of the state (resulting from falling state revenues and rising expenses) are also important contributors.
The public policy response to the Wuhan coronavirus, which seems to be widespread around the world, made popular immiserisation a matter of public policy. It is no accident, dear reader, that when dissenters characterize it as "Mask up, shut up, and fort up on your government checks until there's a vaccine or the Rapture" there might be self-styled progressives and tech oligarchs are fine with it. It's not so much neoliberalism at work, Joel Kotkin's characterization of the new reality as
neofeudalism might be more to the point.
Millions of small businesses are near extinction, millions more losing their jobs and many others stuck into the status of a property-less serfs. The big winners have been the “expert” class of the clerisy and, most of all, the tech oligarchs, who benefit as people rely more on algorithms than human relationships.
Following a remarkable epoch of greater dispersion of wealth and opportunity, we are inexorably returning towards a more feudal era marked by greater concentration of wealth and property, reduced upward mobility, demographic stagnation, and increased dogmatism.
In a related essay, Professor Kotkin
spells out a series of scenarios, none of them encouraging.
Without a greater and more dispersed expansion of democratic capitalism, the only alternative to constant disorder may be massive growth instead of the welfare state. This approach might take the form of “oligarchic socialism,” the kind of guaranteed income widely endorsed among the tech elite — who clearly benefited from the pandemic. This represents, in Marx’s phrase, “the proletarian alms bag” that can keep both destitution, and social revolution, at bay while allowing the ultrarich to maintain their dominance.
Certainly even the most blinkered geeks realize that scenes on the streets of places like San Francisco, where obscene wealth is surrounded by disorderly, malodorous and chaotic streets, cannot be sustained forever. Some massive injections of public money will be critical just to maintain basic order.
But this is not a call for renewed upward mobility. Indeed some on the Left, notably in the environmental community, see the lockdowns not as tragedy but as a “fire drill” for future actions to force people to reduce consumption and live as the privileged nomenklatura sees fit.
Such an approach all but guarantees a succession of new peasant rebellions, a predictable middle class backlash, and ever-escalating demands for ever-higher transfer payments, with some proposing $8000 monthly for families of four during the pandemic. This would make work hardly worthwhile for most, and turn politics into a game to satisfy poorer citizens with “bread and circuses,” as was the case in Rome.
Sadly, this approach will do little to encourage upward mobility. It will simply nurture and expand the serf class. These young people, and inner-city residents, deserve something more than cheap expressions of sympathy and solidarity from the affluent. They need to develop a new urban paradigm that boosts opportunities rather expanding serfdom. Only by restoring broad upward mobility can we hope to maintain a healthy democratic society.
Not to mention that Rome eventually ran out of resources to provide bread and circuses, and that the middle class "backlash" he's referring to is simply restoring a state of good repair, understood as upward mobility. I have to wonder, though, whether
enough people have migrated upward that it's easier for them to work from home, tip generously for home delivery and curb-side pickup, and see the continued allowances for not working to continue rather than agitating more aggressively to reopen businesses.
In Professor Kotkin's own California, for instance,
the state is growing poorer, with more income polarization, and growing older. That's not likely to turn out well.
Until now, the alliance of the oligarchs with the progressive clerisy, almost unanimously supported by the media, has been all but immune from challenge. Yet there exist in this alliance what Marxists might call fundamental “contradictions” that could eventually undermine the cozy arrangement between the rapacious capitalists of the Valley and their militant progressive allies.
This can be seen in growing conflicts between the oligarchs and the state’s increasingly assertive Left. The youth activists now at the forefront of the anti–climate change movement may be less willing to tolerate the oligarchy’s personal excesses than previous generations of environmental advocates. After all, if the world is on the verge of a global apocalypse, how can the luxurious lifestyles of those flying their private jets to discuss this “crisis,” like Leonardo DiCaprio or the heads of Google, be tolerated?
That's something Professor Turchin misses, as he concludes hoping for yet another Expert Consensus.
What we need is a nonpolitical, indeed a fiercely non-partisan center/institute/think tank that would develop and refine a better scientific understanding of how we got into this mess; and then translate that science into policy to help us get out of it.
Our society, like all previous complex societies, is on a rollercoaster. Impersonal social forces bring us to the top; then comes the inevitable plunge. But the descent is not inevitable. Ours is the first society that can perceive how those forces operate, even if dimly. This means that we can avoid the worst – perhaps by switching to a less harrowing track, perhaps by redesigning the rollercoaster altogether.
Sorry. Emergence doesn't work that way. I'm skeptical that the Expertise that
got enough people angry enough to put first Barack Obama and then Donald Trump in the White House, the Expertise that has spent the last four years invalidating Britain's exit from the European Union and undoing the Trump presidency, that has turned fifteen days to slow the spread into
who knows how many years of house arrests, is going to do any better redesigning a rollercoaster than the proverbial committee designing a horse.