29.1.25

YOU DON'T BETTER MANKIND BY ENSLAVING IT.

That might be the real answer to Jim Jump's question, "Did the Ivy League Really Break America?" in Inside Higher Ed.  (Should I refer to him as Coach Jump?)  He's reacting to David Brooks's "How the Ivy League Broke America" which begins with this potted sociology.
Every coherent society has a social ideal—an image of what the superior person looks like. In America, from the late 19th century until sometime in the 1950s, the superior person was the Well-Bred Man. Such a man was born into one of the old WASP families that dominated the elite social circles on Fifth Avenue, in New York City; the Main Line, outside Philadelphia; Beacon Hill, in Boston. He was molded at a prep school like Groton or Choate, and came of age at Harvard, Yale, or Princeton. In those days, you didn’t have to be brilliant or hardworking to get into Harvard, but it really helped if you were “clubbable”—good-looking, athletic, graceful, casually elegant, Episcopalian, and white. It really helped, too, if your dad had gone there.

Once on campus, studying was frowned upon. Those who cared about academics—the “grinds”—were social outcasts. But students competed ferociously to get into the elite social clubs: Ivy at Princeton, Skull and Bones at Yale, the Porcellian at Harvard. These clubs provided the well-placed few with the connections that would help them ascend to white-shoe law firms, to prestigious banks, to the State Department, perhaps even to the White House. (From 1901 to 1921, every American president went to Harvard, Yale, or Princeton.) People living according to this social ideal valued not academic accomplishment but refined manners, prudent judgment, and the habit of command. This was the age of social privilege.
Social privilege there might have been, and yet that introduction does nothing, nothing, to support his assertion, "The meritocracy isn’t working. We need something new."  Note how the titans of industry, the masters of Great Lakes steamers, the engineers that laid out the railroads as well as the engineers who ran the trains might have been able to live their lives without ever encountering a Harvard man, let alone worrying about being "clubbable" outside the local Brotherhood, Grange, or Masonic lodge, or after the overseas wars that those Clubbable Men started getting the country into, the American Legion or the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Never mind that, Harvard president James Conant opted to go all Philosopher King.
Conant did not believe the United States could rise to the challenges of the 20th century if it was led by the heirs of a few incestuously interconnected Mayflower families.

So Conant and others set out to get rid of admissions criteria based on bloodlines and breeding and replace them with criteria centered on brainpower. His system was predicated on the idea that the highest human trait is intelligence, and that intelligence is revealed through academic achievement.

By shifting admissions criteria in this way, he hoped to realize Thomas Jefferson’s dream of a natural aristocracy of talent, culling the smartest people from all ranks of society. Conant wanted to create a nation with more social mobility and less class conflict. He presided during a time, roughly the middle third of the 20th century, when people had lavish faith in social-engineering projects and central planning—in using scientific means to, say, run the Soviet economy, or build new cities like Brasília, or construct a system of efficiency-maximizing roadways that would have cut through Greenwich Village.
Yes, that worked out so well, didn't it?  Mr Jump takes up the argument from there.
Conant and his peers believed the change would lead to a nation with greater opportunities for social mobility.

Brooks seems far from sure that the change was positive for America. He acknowledges that “the amount of bigotry—against women, Black people, the LGBTQ community—has declined” (that might be debatable given the current political climate), but observes that the previous ideal produced the New Deal, victory in World War II, NATO and the postwar world led by America, while the products of the ideal pushed by Conant have produced “quagmires in Vietnam and Afghanistan, needless carnage in Iraq, the 2008 financial crisis, the toxic rise of social media, and our current age of political dysfunction.” Those examples seem cherry-picked.

In the essay, Brooks cites a number of troubling societal problems and trends, all supported with extensive research, but the weakness of his argument is that he tries to find a single cause to explain all of them. That common denominator is what he calls “meritocracy.”
Yes, and if we call the roll of the meritocrats Mr Brooks hails,  the descriptions "smarter and more diverse" do not come to my mind.  "Classic achiever types such as Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, Jamie Dimon, Ketanji Brown Jackson, Lin-Manuel Miranda, Pete Buttigieg, Julián Castro, Sundar Pichai, Jeff Bezos, and Indra Nooyi have been funneled through prestigious schools and now occupy key posts in American life."  As far as Mr Jump's "debatable," maybe we've seen enough hectoring harridans, from elementary school to the Senate; enough incompetence; and enough mentally disturbed boys in the girls' sports that it's clear academic talent is being balanced against other objectives and the Militant Normals are noticing.  As did Mr Jump.
What is the consequence of having a student body full of those who are good at playing the résumé-building game?

There is one other issue raised by Brooks that I find particularly important. He argues that those who are successful in the elite admission process end up possessing greater “hubris,” in that they believe their success is the product of their talent and hard work rather than privilege and luck. Rather than appreciating their good fortune, they may believe they are entitled to it. That misconception may also fuel the populist backlash to elites that has increased the division within our country.
He calls it "backlash."  I call it restoring a state of good repair, after the accumulating evidence, whether it is of futile nation-building wars, of education reforms that leave the kiddos dumber, or of the corona tyranny that has occupied so much of my attention in the past four years.  Mr Brooks sort of gets it.
We can scorn the smug WASP blue bloods from Groton and Choate—and certainly their era’s retrograde views of race and gender—but their leadership helped produce the Progressive movement, the New Deal, victory in World War II, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the postwar Pax Americana. After the meritocrats took over in the 1960s, we got quagmires in Vietnam and Afghanistan, needless carnage in Iraq, the 2008 financial crisis, the toxic rise of social media, and our current age of political dysfunction.
There's a lot more elaboration on those points in the article.  It's well worth scrolling through.  Let's say there's nothing there to convince me to revisit, revise, or rebut much of what I've been carrying on for lo these twenty years.  Bet on emergence, and let complexity do what complexity does.  If anything, now is the time to question both the current credentialling mania, and the administrative state, which might exist to provide employment opportunities for Ivy graduates and grants to Ivy professors to continue the status quo.  New York "Intelligencer" columnist Ed Kilgore makes the argument for me.
[W]hile I am a career-long fan of “reinventing government” by examining how government policies are enforced and services are delivered, I’d argue that this may be a particularly bad time to turn the bureaucracy upside down and remake the federal public sector into a lean-and-mean instrument for the current controlling party’s governing vision and patronage needs. The “deep state” may be a crucial source of stability in an era during which the electorate keeps delivering and then denying power to one of two major political parties that agree on very little other than the wickedness of their opponents. In other countries with parliamentary systems and multiple political parties, coalition governments are a way around the problem of unstable majorities. Our winner-take-all system makes that impossible, and when someone like Trump comes along who wants to test the boundaries of power in every direction, any sense of continuity goes out the window.

In much of the 20th century, bipartisanship (along with ideological diversity within the two major parties) smoothed the rough edges of transitions in presidential and congressional power.
How has that stability worked out since the end of the Cold War?  How stable have those parliamentary governments turned out to be?  In Europe, to what extent have those governments ceding their authority to the European Union and the "international institutions?" produced better outcomes?

If anything, three observations I made as last summer gave way to fall suggest that both the current model of credentialism and the Credentialled Experts staffing Permanent Washington, the legacy media, and the academy have worn out their welcome.  First, "Whether it's Barack Obama with his 'bitter clingers' or Hillary Clinton with her 'basket of deplorables' or what remained of Joe Biden with his mega-ultra-Maga ranting, the professional-managerial class and their freakazoid cheering section have had a party while the Normals rack up credit card debt."  Second, "Donald Trump, recall, is not the cause of the political problem.  He is the 'break glass in case of emergency' the Militant Normals went to after establishment Republicans offered Bob Dole and John McCain and Mitt Romney to stop the worst excesses of the administrative state."  Third, now is the time to turf them out.  "If not now, getting that even heavier boot off our necks in four years might prove more difficult."

2 comments:

David Foster said...

50+ years ago, Peter Drucker wrote that a major advantage that America had over Europe was that we did *not* have a small number of 'elite' universities acting as gatekeepers to the key positions in the society. Drucker's perception of the importance of the Ivy League was very different than that of David Brooks.
https://chicagoboyz.net/archives/50249.html

Stephen Karlson said...

Yes, and since then the state flagships, the land-grants, and the mid-majors lost sight of their responsibility to offer the same sort of intellectual challenges and suitable opportunities to develop professional networks that the Ivies do. And in their pivot to what I call access-assessment-remediation-retention they pushed ambitious students away and created the demand for those college guides U. S. News and the like started selling.