A
lengthy post by Bret Devereaux, who appears to be a historian of some sort, provokes the title of my post. As he develops his thesis, he offers the following origin story for the war.
The current war is best understood as the product of a fairly extreme gamble, although it is unclear to me if the current administration understood they were throwing the dice in June of 2025 rather than this year. As we’re going to see, this was not a super-well-planned-out affair.
The gamble was this: that the Iranian regime was weak enough that a solid blow, delivered primarily from the air, picking off key leaders, could cause it to collapse. For the United States, the hope seems to have been that a transition could then be managed to leaders perhaps associated with the regime but who would be significantly more pliant, along the lines of the regime change operation performed in Venezuela that put Delcy Rodriguez in power. By contrast, Israel seems to have been content to simply collapse the Iranian regime and replace it with nothing.
I note before we continue that National Command Authority anticipated an air campaign in excess of a month, that the United States and Israel have goals that align but are not congruent, that no battle plan survives its first encounter with the enemy, and that had the United States and Israel clobbered the mullahs on the basis of actionable intelligence that they would be meeting somewhere in Teheran without any coherent follow-on operations, somebody would probably already have leaked that to one of the legacy newspapers.
It is to that "solid blow" that I wish to turn. Recall,
in the summer of 1861, how the Georgetown cocktail party set packed picnic baskets and headed into Virginia to watch Gen
l McDowell and his forces smash up the secesh, march On to Richmond, and settle that hash once and for all. We know that McDowell's plans came a cropper and that the cocktail party set got caught up in the ensuing skedaddle.
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Federal forces had prevailed and been able to occupy Richmond. Mr Devereaux's essay works as an explainer for how occupying Richmond, with no forces in Memphis or New Orleans or Atlanta or Charleston would have failed. The original capital city of the seceded states was in Montgomery, and it would be straightforward enough to return the political class there: and until something like Gideon Welles's
Anaconda Plan closed the ports and reopened the Mississippi for the Union and wrecked the secesh's industrial base the war would go on. If you think cartoonists of the era
slagged on Abraham Lincoln for pursuing the war the way he, with Grant, Sheridan, Sherman; and Farragut and Porter did it, imagine those cartoonists with Richmond occupied and yet the war continuing. Consider, also, that even with first Lee and then Johnston surrendering in
April 1865 and with New Orleans, Atlanta, Charleston, and Richmond occupied, unreconstructed elements (in the manner of Iran's revolutionary guards with free rein to act locally) could continue the fight for years. That's how the "Southern" "Poverty" "Law" Center made its civil rights bones,
back in the day, litigating against such elements.