Alon Levy is with New York University's
Marron Institute, focusing on urban transportation. He recently
sat down with an Asterisk correspondent. "The United States has the most expensive transportation infrastructure in the world. That’s because we refuse to learn from experts, other countries, and our own history." That might be the thesis. Everything you need to know, dear reader, is in the opening exchange.
Asterisk: The overarching question in your transit policy career has been: Why is America so bad at building transit systems? Earlier this year, your team at NYU released a massive report comparing transit costs in Istanbul, Italy, Sweden and Boston, and then, of course, New York. It culminates in your fantastic case study of the Second Avenue subway line. And that’s where I wanted to start. What went wrong?
Alon Levy:Let’s go back to John Hylan.
Hylan was a populist mayor between 1918 and 1925. He ran against various corporate interests, which at the time included private streetcar companies. Hylan was hostile to the private operators. This led to bustitution — using buses to undercut the streetcar companies, though even then it was clear that the buses were providing inferior service that cost more to provide.1
And he was also against the private companies that were running the subway. So the city started building something called the Independent Subway System, commonly known as IND (because the private companies were called IRT, Interborough Rapid Transit). It was built by the city with the express purpose of driving the privates out of business — so the lines were kind of duplicative of the older lines. Only in two places did they truly expand into new places that were not served before. One is the G train, the Crosstown Line between Long Island City and downtown Brooklyn. The other is the Queens Boulevard line.
It added value. But it was also redundant on purpose — and it culminated in the city buying out the private operators at Depression prices.
Ah, yes, John Hylan, also known as John "Red" Hylan. "Populist" is being polite. And yes, he thought city management could provide a better subway service than that offered by the two private companies, the Interborough and the Brooklyn-Manhattan Transit, or BMT. (And if you wonder why some New York subway routes are letters and some numbers, well, the old A train was a BMT route.) Most of the interview focuses on the sort of process worship that followed from the city's construction protocols.
No, 13,000 people in the United States work for a state government who are appointed by the governor or lower-level official. The governor may choose to appoint a technocrat, but it’s not expected. And then there’s also the indirect people, the people who these appointees hire as their personal staff. When these people walk into the room, the experienced civil servants lower their heads a little bit. When you tell the civil service that it’s always going to be on the lower end of the class system, you’re going to lose the best people. The best people will pick a career path that lets them be on top, which in this system means they’re doing many different things and never learn one thing well.
What do I keep telling you, dear reader, about
complexity confounding coordination.
There's a lot to digest in the article, it comes down to the absence of anyone with the vision of Alexander J. Cassatt and the drive of J. Edgar Thomson. "But Penn Station has actually languished at the hands of another simple reality: No one has the leverage to fix it. " It's another inheritance from the truly most destructive generation of the modern era, the process-worshippers of the Silent Generation. "Since the 1970s, even as progressives have championed Big Government, they’ve worked tirelessly to put new checks on its power—to pull it away from imperious technocrats who might use government to bulldoze hapless communities." It's enough to make a Marxist giggle (a phrase that I lifted from Trains editor David P. Morgan, who noted the rigamarole strangling Commuter Rail service in New York in the late 1950s.)
Mr Dunkelman is still a believer in the power of Governance by Wise Experts. "To rebuild faith in the power of government to do good, responsible leaders need the power to pursue the public interest." I fear, though, that he has really made the case that the best thing for the Wise Experts to do is to go away.
First, though, we might want the government to go away. Red Hylan had a counterpart in Detroit mayor James Couzens, who thought the way to keep the investor owned streetcars of the Detroit United Railway (itself, as this was easier to do with infrastructure inherited from horse-car companies, an amalgamation of several streetcar lines) from overcharging commuters was to build a city-owned streetcar system and a fleet of Birney Safety Cars (yes, the same as Milwaukee's dinkeys) to serve the passengers. As was the case in New York, the municipal operation was with a view to getting Detroit United to sell to the city. That Detroit was becoming known for its production of flivvers adds spice to the story. From 1920 when the first Couzens Cooties, er, Birneys, started running, until 1956, when the last Detroit Street Railway cars went out of service, that government took more interest in providing the infrastructure for the products its residents assembled.